Eros And Civilization.pdf

HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

Vol. 12 No. 1

pp. 73–90

[0952-6951(199902)12:1;73-90; 007788]

Eros and Civilization revisited

PETER M. R. STIRK

A BSTRACT

The article consists of a re-examination of Marcuse’s Eros and Civiliz-

ation in the light of continuing interest in that work. After a brief con-

sideration of Marcuse’s attempt to use Freud to indict contemporary

civilization, focusing on the concepts of surplus repression and guilt,

the article turns to his utopian sketch of Eros as a culture builder and

the reconciliation of reason and instinct. These themes, which form the

focus of recent interest, are explored by examining Marcuse’s interpre-

tation of Kant and Schiller as well as Freud. In all cases Marcuse’s

interpretation is shown to be ﬂawed. The conclusion is that Marcuse’s

attempt to indict established reason in the light of instinct and yet to

hold out the prospect of a reconciliation of reason and instinct leads to

an impoverished concept of both.

Key words critical theory, Freud, Marcuse, philosophy, psychology

Eros and Civilization was Herbert Marcuse’s most provocative book. The

contentious interpretation of Freud, the general thesis, namely that a society

pervaded by Eros was within the grasp of men, as well as the celebration of

‘polymorphous perversity’ and many other details of interpretation, all con-

tributed to its status as a radically utopian work. Over 20 years later Jürgen

Habermas recalled the ‘stunning impression’ of Marcuse’s exposition of his

ideas in a lecture on Freud in 1956. For Habermas and his fellow research

assistants in the Institute for Social Research ‘this was the moment when we

ﬁrst faced an embodiment and vivid expression of the political spirit of the

old Frankfurt School’ (Habermas, 1985: 68; see also Dews, 1992: 206–7).

Despite the numerous and often telling criticisms of Eros and Civilization ,

HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

12(1)

it has continued to exert a certain fascination, partly in its own right and partly

because of a revival of interest in Erich Fromm. It has naturally been of

concern in the surveys of Marcuse’s thought, though these do not show any

consensus about its validity and wider signiﬁcance (Flego and Schmied-

Kowarzik, 1989; Geohagen, 1981; Institut für Sozialforschung, 1992; Katz,

1982; Kellner, 1984; Pippin, 1988; Schoolman, 1980). Indeed the editors of one

volume drew attention to the growing divergence in attitudes to Eros and

Civilization , ranging from outright dismissal to enthusiastic assertions of its

contemporary relevance (Flego and Schmied-Kowarzik, 1989: 7–8). It also

ﬁgures prominently in some approaches to Freud and in works concerned

with the relation between critical theory and psychology, again with no

evident consensus (Jacoby, 1975; Ricoeur, 1970; Whitebook, 1995; White-

book, 1996). The revival of interest in the ideas of Fromm, whose supporters

claim he has been unjustly neglected, in part at least as a result of the accu-

sation levelled at him by Marcuse, has also contributed to persistent interest

in Eros and Civilization (Bronner, 1994; Burston, 1991; Erich-Fromm-

Gesellschaft, 1991; Funk, 1980; Rickert, 1986). Like Marcuse, Fromm had

been a member of the Frankfurt School. He had, however, parted, amid some

animosity, in 1939 (Horkheimer, 1995: 666–7). Fromm’s revision of Freudian

theory came under attack from Marcuse in an article in Dissent shortly before

the publication of Eros and Civilization . The polemic between Marcuse and

Fromm, the ground for which had been laid earlier, helps to explain, if not

justify, Marcuse’s sometimes obdurate defence of Freud. Marcuse’s avowed

concern was ‘not with a corrected or improved interpretation of Freudian

concepts but with their philosophical and sociological implications’ (Marcuse,

1969: 25). 1 By constantly insisting upon denial of gratiﬁcation, the repression

of instincts for the sake of ‘civilization’, Freud’s theory was an indictment of

existing civilization. In Marcuse’s eyes, Fromm’s revisionism, the rejection of

Freud’s theory of instincts, called into question ‘a radically critical theory’ and

was, by that very fact, suspect (Marcuse, 1969: 167).

The polemic against Fromm and other revisionists forms part of the back-

ground to Eros and Civilization , but only part. Also essential to under-

standing Marcuse’s stance in Eros and Civilization is his advocacy of

hedonism, which pre-dated any sustained interest in Freud. His essay of

1938, ‘On Hedonism’, criticized the disparagement of sensual pleasure but at

the same time claimed that ‘The designation of happiness as the condition of

the comprehensive gratiﬁcation of the individual’s needs and wants is abstract

and incorrect as long as it accepts needs and wants as ultimate data in their

present form’ (Marcuse, 1968: 189).

The third element to the background to Eros and Civilization was, of

course, the patent absence of any revolutionary impulse in the western world

after the Second World War. Along with his colleagues in the Institute for

Social Research he had taken it as axiomatic that the productive capacities of

‘EROS AND CIVILIZATION’ REVISITED

modern, capitalist societies had developed to such an extent that a radically

different type of society was possible. They further assumed that this should

have been evident to all and that if it was not some explanation had to be

found for why the anticipated insight into the possibility and desirability of

a new type of society had been blocked (Marcuse, 1969: 11). 2 The questions

underlying Eros and Civilization were really those bequeathed by Marx:

How do we know when a mode of production is obsolete? Why should men

recognize this obsolescence? Why should they act on that insight and abolish

that mode of production? Turning to Freud for an answer to these questions

was not the most obvious strategy. Earlier, in ‘On Hedonism’, he had

remained on more traditional socialist ground and had argued that ‘only

those groups with the greatest purchasing power can take advantage of the

expanded capacities [provided by modern technology] and their gratiﬁcation’

(Marcuse, 1968: 184). But this made no sense against the backcloth of the

post-war afﬂuent society. Worse still the afﬂuent society was also a more per-

missive one. As he acknowledged in 1966 ‘it made no sense to talk about

surplus repression when men and women enjoy more sexual liberty than ever

before’ (Marcuse, 1969: 12). 3 But talk about it he did.

These issues, the often bitter dispute over the status of Freud’s theories, the

signiﬁcance of hedonism in afﬂuent and permissive societies, the problem of

how to sustain a radical critique of society with revolutionary ambitions in

an age in which radical social movements and utopian perspectives had dis-

appeared from the agenda, all help to explain the initial impact and continued

interest in Eros and Civilization , as well as Marcuse’s own motives and style.

This article, however, is concerned to assess Marcuse’s arguments and to do

so by measuring the claims he makes against his own sources. It seeks to

proceed through an immanent critique, which he and the other members of

the Institute for Social Research held up as their own preferred method.

Surplus repression played a key role in Marcuse’s argument. It was this

which allowed him to assert the obsolescence of current society. Surplus

repression was deﬁned as follows: ‘the restrictions necessitated by social

domination. This is distinguished from (basic) repression : the “modiﬁcation”

of the instincts necessary for the perpetuations of the human race in civiliz-

ation’ (Marcuse, 1969: 42). The distinction between basic and surplus repres-

sion has induced much dubious speculation on analogies with Marxian

concepts. According to Morton Schoolman Marcuse’s concepts of basic and

surplus repression are extrapolations from Marx’s socially necessary and

surplus labour (Schoolman, 1980: 94–5; see also Kellner, 1984: 164). But this

is wrong. The problem with surplus labour for Marx is not that it exists. The

problem is that its product is expropriated by capitalists. The problem with

surplus repression for Marcuse is that it exists at all. The point is to abolish it.

There is, however, one useful thing to emerge from the comparison with

Marx’s concepts. Surplus labour is, in principle, measurable. At least it was

HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES

12(1)

in the abstract models in which Marx introduced the concept. Can the same

be said for surplus repression? It is important that it can, for it is surplus

repression alone which has to be abolished. Moreover, the concept of surplus

repression promised to provide a solution to another problem, that is, how

can we talk about surplus repression in a more permissive and afﬂuent

society? According to Marcuse, ‘[t]he same and even a reduced scope of

instinctual regimentation would constitute a higher degree of repression at a

mature stage of civilization’ (Marcuse, 1969: 74). From this perspective even

the afﬂuent and permissive society could be repressive, and even more repres-

sive than less afﬂuent and less permissive stages of civilization. If the gap

between the level of repression required, given the level of economic develop-

ment, and that actually operative grew, the more mature stage would be more

repressive. At one point Marcuse seemed to ﬁnd an answer. He picked up

two distinct themes in Freud. The ﬁrst was the idea that sexual instincts were

inimical to civilization and had to be repressed. The second was that there

was an erotic component to society. Seizing upon the apparent ambiguity he

proclaimed that ‘the free Eros does not preclude lasting civilized societal

relationships ... it repels only the supra-repressive organization of societal

relationships’ (Marcuse, 1969: 46–7).

Marcuse wanted an instinct, Eros, to discriminate. It is, indeed, possible to

talk of instinctual discrimination between all kinds of things. But not in this

case. Marcuse required discrimination between necessary and surplus repres-

sion, where what is necessary and what is surplus are, at his own insistence,

historically variable. Although he repeated the assertion that Eros could dis-

criminate in the way required, he did not develop the suggestion in any detail

(see Rotenstreich, 1970: 46–7). Indeed, he may have been aware of the weak-

ness of the idea for he reverted to a more prosaic position. At the end Marcuse

was reduced to asserting that everyone would recognize, consciously, the dis-

tinction, were they not prevented from doing so. But that was merely to go

back to the starting-point. Instinct had not been able to provide a substitute

for insight but the insight was stubbornly absent.

An alternative was to try to ﬁnd some other psychological index of the

repressiveness of society. An obvious candidate was guilt. Indeed in recent

interpretations Marcuse’s account of guilt has been singled out for praise

(Schmid-Noerr, 1990: 206). In the lecture which inspired Habermas, Marcuse

declared that ‘This is Freud’s revolutionary insight: the conﬂict ... between

the reality of repression and the almost equally real possibility of doing away

with repression’ (Marcuse, 1970a: 18). It was precisely this which was sup-

posed to account for the feeling of guilt. Guilt was not merely internalized

repression but was also ‘guilt about a freedom that one has both missed and

betrayed’ (Marcuse, 1970a: 18). One would expect that this would lead

Marcuse to argue that the feeling of guilt had increased parallel with the possi-

bility of putting an end to repression. Indeed, he did. He was able to quote

‘EROS AND CIVILIZATION’ REVISITED

Freud speculating upon the increase of guilt to the point ‘perhaps ... that

individuals can hardly support’ (Marcuse, 1969: 70). But for Freud this had

nothing to do with the possibility of putting an end to repression. Accord-

ing to Freud’s speculation, guilt increased because, in some opaque way, the

conﬂicts within the family that ﬁrst led to the feeling of guilt, were repeated

as the community was extended beyond the family. Hence, the wider the

community the greater the feeling of guilt. It is ironic that Marcuse quoted

the very passage in which Freud said this, for he was then obliged to lament

that ‘the change in the quality of guiltiness, its growing irrationality, seems

to disappear’ (Marcuse, 1969: 70). . If Marcuse had followed through the line

of Freud’s speculation the incompatibility between his interpretation and

Freud’s would have become even clearer. For when Freud suggested there

might be a ‘cultural super-ego’ whose excessive demands threatened to

produce ‘neurotic’ civilizations he did not bemoan the renunciation of gratiﬁ-

cation. Instead he quoted the Christian injunction to ‘Love thy neighbour as

thyself’ in order to denounce it as incompatible with the egoism of human

nature (Freud, 1975: 80). 4

The dubious interpretation of Freud would not matter if Marcuse had been

able to ﬁnd other support for his contention that there was a feeling of guilt

which could be tied to his postulation of ‘surplus repression’. But this he

could not do. He did seek to deploy other Freudian models to explain why

men did not rebel. There, however, he took it for granted that rebellion was

warranted, that the obsolescence of the existing socioeconomic order would

have been evident were it not for the mechanisms that blocked this insight. 5

All he could do beyond this, was to point to the well-known horrors of the

20th century and denounce the destructiveness of modern civilization.

This weakness may well explain why the distinction between basic and

surplus repression now receives cursory attention, where it is noted at all. It

is not the appropriation of Freud as part of a, ultimately Marxian, theory of

revolution that now holds centre stage, but the appropriation of Freud as part

of a utopian sketch. Marcuse’s utopia, as outlined in Eros and Civilization,

rested on two related claims. The ﬁrst was the general point that ‘the free Eros

does not preclude lasting civilized societal relationships’ (Marcuse, 1969: 46).

Here all Marcuse had to do was to demonstrate that men were not inherently

anti-social beings. The second was the more speciﬁc claim that there was a

‘libidinous morality’. This is a much more demanding assertion. Here it was

not sufﬁcient to prove that the contours of ‘civilized societal relationships’

could be discerned in the instincts.

The compatibility of Eros and civilization was defended on two levels.

First, Marcuse claimed that Freud’s psychology was an adequate basis for

sketching his utopia. This was bound up with his hostility to the revisionists

who claimed that Freud’s theories had to be corrected or supplemented by

social and cultural factors. Ironically though, in his strongest formulation of

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