Rasmusen E., An Introduction to Game Theory.pdf

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GAMES AND INFORMATION, FOURTH EDITION
An Introduction to Game Theory
Eric Rasmusen
Basil Blackwell
v
Contents
1
(starred sections are less important)
List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
Contents and Purpose
Changes in the Second Edition
Changes in the Third Edition
Using the Book
The Level of Mathematics
Other Books
Contact Information
Acknowledgements
Introduction
History
Game Theory’s Method
Exemplifying Theory
This Book’s Style
Notes
PART 1: GAME THEORY
1 The Rules of the Game
1.1 Definitions
1.2 Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordina-
tion
1.5 Focal Points
Notes
Problems
xxx February 2, 2000. December 12, 2003. 24 March 2005. Eric Rasmusen, Erasmuse@indiana.edu.
http://www.rasmusen.org/GI Footnotes starting with xxx are the author’s notes to himself. Comments
are welcomed.
1
vi
2 Information
2.1 The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game
2.2 Information Sets
2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information
2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games
2.5 Example: The Png Settlement Game
Notes
Problems
3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies
3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game
3.2 Chicken, The War of Attrition, and Correlated Strategies
3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and
N
Players: The Civic Duty Game
3.4 Different Uses of Mixing and Randomizing: Minimax and the Auditing Game
3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game
3.6 Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strate-
gic Subsitutes
3.7 Existence of Equilibrium
Notes
Problems
4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
4.1 Subgame Perfectness
4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I
4.3 Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nui-
sance Suits
*4.4 Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection
Notes
Problems
5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox
5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem
5.3 Reputation: the One-sided Prisoner’s Dilemma
5.4 Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game
vii
*5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations in the Game of Customer Switch-
ing Costs
*5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game
Notes
Problems
6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III
6.2 Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: the PhD Admissions Game
6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V
6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Gang of Four
Model
6.5 The Axelrod Tournament
*6.6 Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model
Notes
Problems
PART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models
7.2 A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game
7.3 The Incentive Compatibility, Participation, and Competition Constraints
7.4 Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game
Notes
Problems
8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard
8.1 Efficiency Wages
8.2 Tournaments
8.3 Institutions and Agency Problems
*8.4 Renegotiation: the Repossession Game
*8.5 State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II
*8.6 Joint Production by Many Agents: the Holmstrom Teams Model
Notes
Problems
9 Adverse Selection
viii
9.1 Introduction: Production Game VI
9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II
9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV
9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III
*9.5 Market Microstructure
*9.6 A Variety of Applications
Notes
Problems
10 Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and in Moral Hazard with Hidden Informa-
tion
10.1 The Revelation Principle and Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge
10.2 An Example of Moral Hazard with Hidden Knowledge: the Salesman Game
*10.3 Price Discrimination
*10.4 Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement
*10.5 The Groves Mechanism
Notes
Problems
11 Signalling
11.1 The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling
11.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education
11.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education
11.4 The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening
*11.5 Two Signals: the Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues
*11.6 Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing
Notes
Problems
PART 3: APPLICATIONS
12 Bargaining
12.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie
12.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
12.3 Alternating Offers over Finite Time
12.4 Alternating Offers over Infinite Time
12.5 Incomplete Information
ix

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